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Moral Perception 
TIMOTHY CHAPPELL 
Abstract 
I develop an account of moral perception which is able to deal well with familiar 
naturalistic non-realist complaints about ontological extravagance and 'queerness'. 
I show how this account can also ground a cogent response to familiar objections 
presented by Simon Blackburn (about supervenience) and J.L. Mackie (about 
motivation). The familiar realist's problem about relativism, however, remains. 
[Phronesis] is of the ultimate particular, of which there is not 
scientific knowledge but perception?not sensory perception, 
but like the perception whereby we perceive that the triangle is 
the ultimate particular in geometry. 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1142a27-29 
Knowing is seeing. 
John Locke, Of the Conduct of the Understanding, s.24 
1. Ontological Minimalism 
The problem with moral realism is widely supposed to be its ontologi 
cal extravagance. So suppose we begin with maximal ontological par 
simony: say, with a metaphysics like the one expressed in Democritus' 
'nothing but atoms and the void'.1 Or even, since Democritus appar 
ently allowed there to be infinitely many atoms, suppose we begin with 
something more minimal still?the hyper-Democritean thesis that 
nothing exists except the void, and in it, the following sixteen-dot 
matrix: 
1 H. Diels and W. Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin: 
Weidmann, repr. 1974), 68 B117. 
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What ontology could be more minimal (except, presumably, one 
with fewer dots)? But even this hyper-Democritean ontological 
minimalism sustains an indefinite multiplicity and complexity of 
patterns. If these sixteen dots exist thus arranged, then it is immedi 
ately not the case that only these sixteen dots exist. There also exists 
every pattern that these sixteen dots constitute. After all, a capacity 
which perceived the sixteen-dot matrix as four four-dot squares 
would be picking up a pattern that is genuinely there in the matrix, 
whether you notice it or not. So would a capacity that perceived it 
as a four-dot square inside a twelve-dot square; and a capacity that 
perceived it as a twelve-dot cross against a background sketched in 
by the four corner-dots; and one that perceived it as three vertical 
or three horizontal corridors... and so on. There is no limit to the pat 
terns that we can find in the diagram?beyond those set by our inge 
nuity, imagination, or mathematical/geometrical aptitude. And, to 
say it again, find, not create, seems to be the right word: the patterns 
would still be there even if we didn't see them. In the words of Daniel 
Dennett: 'Other creatures with different sense organs, or different inter 
ests, might readily perceive patterns that were imperceptible to us. 
The patterns would be there all along, just imperceptible to us'2 
(Though he claims to be uninterested in the labels 'realist' and 
'instrumentalist', Dennett has no qualms about talking of 'the 
brute existence of pattern' (op. cit. p. 51), and of patterns as 'existing' 
and 'real'?which all sounds like realist, not instrumentalist, talk 
to me.) 
Now, plausibly, the world is a good deal more ontologically 
complex?even on the simplest and most reductive reading of what 
counts as 'the world'?than a sixteen-dot matrix. (Even on 
Democritus' reductive account it is an infinitely-many-dot matrix.) 
A fortiori, then, the world contains far more patterns than those in 
the sixteen-dot matrix. And these patterns are really there in the 
world: or at any rate, they are just as much really there in the world 
as the dot-patterns listed in the last paragraph are really there in the 
sixteen-dot matrix. 
The first moral of this little tale is that it's not as easy as it looks to 
be ontologically parsimonious. No doubt we could say, if we chose, 
that all these perceived patterns in the sixteen-dot matrix are just in 
the head, or are just interpretations of that matrix, so that the 
matrix is all that really exists. Such claims may keep our ontology 
nice and sparse, but they look unattractive in almost all other respects. 
2 Daniel Dennett, 'Real Patterns', Journal of Philosophy 88.1 (1991): 
27-51. 
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To cite just the most obvious difficulty: since mathematics seems to 
be largely the study of the logical behaviour of patterns like these, 
a parsimonious attitude to the ontology of such things as dot-matrices 
apparently commits us to saying that mathematics is all in the head. 
Whatever there might be to be said for fictionalism about mathemat 
ics and allied positions (and that is not my topic here, so I will not 
pursue it), this is not, intuitively, a welcome consequence. It's not 
hard to see why we might have more sympathy with the more onto 
logically generous attitude described above, and stick with the intui 
tively appealing affirmation that the patterns really are there no 
matter whether we see them. 
So much for the first moral. The little tale has other morals too. 
Two in particular: patterns are properties of such matrices; and the 
recognition of such patterns is a kind of perception. I take these 
points in turn in sections 2-3. 
2. Patterns and Properties 
Perhaps not all properties are patterns. Perhaps not all patterns are 
properties. But certainly some patterns are properties: for instance, 
as already pointed out, the patterns in the matrices described in 
section 1 are properties of those matrices. At least we may say this: 
the marks of a pattern and the marks of a property are, when one 
thinks them through, remarkably similar. Consider eight marks. 
(1) Intensionality : There are the same sort of reasons for treating 
both patterns and properties as intensional entities. Just as the 
same extension (the man Benjamin Franklin) can coincide 
with more than one intension (the inventor of bifocals, the 
first US postmaster-general), so the same 'instantiation 
base' can simultaneously support more than one pattern, 
and more than one property. (The sixteen-dot matrix simul 
taneously supports the pattern of four four-dot squares, and 
the pattern of a twelve-dot cross with four dots for corners.) 
(2) Abundance I (instantiation): We have parallel reasons for 
saying that as many patterns as can be seen in a given state 
of affairs are actually present in that state of affairs, and for 
saying the same about properties. 
(3) Abundance II (the modality principle): Some people say that 
any property exists if it is metaphysically possible for it to 
be instantiated. Just the same claim might be made about pat 
terns, and the methods of rejecting such a claim, if we wanted 
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to, would be very like the methods of rejecting the modality 
principle for properties. 
(4) Uninstantiated existence: The questions whether properties 
exist if they have no instances, and whether patterns exist 
without instances, clearly turn together. An intuitive answer 
to the question about patterns is that a pattern can be real 
whether or not it has exemplars. If we accept that, we 
should accept the corresponding answer to the question 
about properties. 
(5) Spatiotemporality: Properties can (in principle) appear any 
where and at any time, given a suitable instantiation base; 
so can patterns. One and the same property can be in 
multiple places at multiple times; so can one and the same 
pattern. 
(6) The (one over many' argument: Often when there is a positive 
answer to the question of what a number of things have in 
common, the natural answer is that those things all exemplify 
the same pattern, just as it is often that those things all exem 
plify the same property. To the alternative ('nominalist') 
replies that those things show patterns or properties which 
are merely similar to each other, and not actually the same, 
there are closely parallel objections (what makes them 
similar, if not their exemplification of the same properties/ 
patterns?). 
(7) The basicity of instantiation: The concept of the instantiation 
of properties does not seem to admit of much further substan 
tive analysis. The same seems true of the concept of the 
instantiation of patterns. 
(8) Substrates: For all that, there is one thing we can say: for a 
property to be instantiated is necessarily for it to be instan 
tiated in something. The same again is true of patterns. 
At the very least, the moral is that patterns give us a useful model of 
how some (many? most?) properties work. Some may accept a stron 
ger moral, that properties are the very same thing as patterns. Some 
putative examples of properties look recalcitrant for this thesis. For 
instance, if spatiotemporal position, or orientation, or the charges 
of electrons or the flavours of quarks, are to be understood as proper 
ties, it may not seem very obvious how instances of these properties 
can also be instances of patterns in any sense except a weak one. 
But I do not need this stronger thesis; it is enough for my purposes 
if patterns are at least a model for interestingly many properties. 
I turn now to pattern-recognition and perception. 
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3. Patterns and Perception 
Perhaps not all perception is pattern-recognition. Perhaps not all 
pattern-recognition is perception. But certainly some pattern 
recognition is perception. Here are four examples. 
(1) Seeing a face. To see something as a face is to represent it 
perceptually as falling under a pattern that many other 
things can or do exemplify: the pattern of the human visage. 
Developmental psychology suggests that face-recognition 
is 'hard-wired' in humans: new-born infants have a capacity 
to lock on to examples of this pattern as soon as they are 
born. Certainly the representational perception of faces, 
and of the subtle and complex ways in which they display 
their owners' thoughts and feelings, is an absolutely standard 
part of the adult human's perceptual repertoire. Faces are 
things that we 'just see', simply and directly and without 
reflection or inference. We can barely imagine ourselves 
into the position of someone (an alien, perhaps) who has to 
work out that a given array is a human face, or what exp 
ression it wears. To us, these facts are given by immediate 
observation. 
(2) Seeing a chair. To see something as a chair is to represent it 
perceptually as falling under a pattern that many other 
things can or do fall under: the property of being a particular 
kind of artefact, designed for sitting on, that is found in most 
human societies. For those of us who have been acculturated 
into any chair-using society, there is rarely any question of 
needing to work out that something is a chair. Exceptions 
are of course possible, as when we are confronted by a radical 
modernist design of chair, or as when we need to decide 
whether something can be used as a chair. As any visitor to 
stately homes knows, some things that are undeniably chairs 
cannot be so used. Such experiences are entertaining, and 
enlightening, because they remind us what it would be like 
to be from a non-chair-using society. It would mean that we 
were put in a position where we could not just see things as 
chairs, and had to decide what counted as a chair by the 
very different method of inference. 
(3) Seeing four cows. To see something as a group of four (four 
anythings?cows will do) is to represent it perceptually as 
falling under a pattern that many other things can or do fall 
under: the property of being a four-numbered collection of 
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things. For those of us who are fully numerate, and where the 
cows are symmetrically arranged thus ::, it will normally be 
possible for us to see that there are four cows in the group 
by direct observation. We will not need to count the cows; 
we will see in one look that there are four of them. Contrast 
what a typical five-year-old will do: she will work out that 
there are four cows not by direct observation, but by pointing 
and counting up to four. Contrast also how most adults would 
deal with a group of thirty-eight cows, which would be by the 
toddler's method with the four cows: in a word, by inference, 
not perception. ('Most adults': there are a gifted few who can 
just see that a group of cows are thirty-eight, or do similar feats 
for even larger numbers.3) 
(4) Reading. If you are a literate Anglophone, then when you see 
the word BREAD you will take it in in one look, and know 
immediately what it says. You will not need to spell it out 
letter by letter, and work out what it says by inference from 
its elements plus principles of combination. You will not be 
so favourably placed when you are confronted by the array 
Xjie6, unless you know enough Russian to know that this is 
the word khlyeb, the Russian for 'bread'. Similarly, you will 
struggle to read the phrase mik? su ongelmas sitte o? unless 
you are sufficiently fluent in Finnish to know that this 
means 'What's your problem, pal?'. 
In these cases, unpractised readers are likely to have to do some 
thing more laborious than just seeing what these inscriptions say. 
They will have to work them out, one step at a time. They will not 
read them, because they will not 'directly' perceive what is written: 
they will infer it from other things that they do perceive. For to 
spell out the word BREAD, letter by letter, and infer from what its 
letters are plus knowledge of the rules of phonetics that 'bread' is 
what the inscription says, is not to read it. 
Dennett (op. cit. p. 34) adds a fifth example, chess: 'Expert chess 
players can instantly perceive (and subsequently recall with high 
accuracy) the total board position in a real game, but are much 
worse at recall if the same pieces are randomly placed on the board, 
An apparent example is described in Bill Bryson, A Short History of 
Nearly Everything (London: Black Swan, 2004), Chapter 3: the Australian 
amateur astronomer Robert Evans can look through a telescope at an array 
of thousands of stars, and see immediately when a new supernova has 
been added to the array. 
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even though to a novice both boards are equally hard to recall... 
expert chess players, unlike novices, not only know how to play 
chess; they know how to read chess?how to see the patterns at a 
glance.' 
To see the cows as four, the chair as a chair, the face as a face, or the 
inscription Xjie? as the word khlyeb (as 'bread'-in-Russian, if you are 
fluent enough in that language), or to 'read' the chess-board accu 
rately; these are all cases where competent observers directly pick 
up a pattern that is present in the relevant perceptual field. In these 
cases the relevant perceptual field is the visual field, but that is of 
no essential importance; similar phenomena can occur in all the 
different sensory modalities. There are also patterns that we pick 
up through more than one sensory modality. Think of the multi 
sensory ways in which you might perceive that you have been insulted 
at a party, or that the England cricket team have just regained the 
Ashes. 
In cases like the five just described, perception is pattern 
recognition in that perception is the capture of a Gestalt. No doubt 
not everything that gets called perception is pattern-recognition of 
this sort; after all, we can distinguish mere seeing from seeing-as. 
But a lot of perception is like this. 
4. Perception and Inference 
This sort of perception can be contrasted with what I am calling infer 
ence. Inference is active, perception is passive. In inference, I set my 
mind to work something out, whereas in perception, something 'just 
comes to me'?I am subject to an occurrence that I do not make 
happen, except in the minimal sense in which I can, e.g., choose in 
which direction I look. Inference is experienced as structured, per 
ception as simple: to perform an inference is, normally, to run 
through a number of steps of reasoning, whereas perceiving some 
thing is a step-less, instantaneous whole. So perception is quick 
where inference is slow: perceiving something can happen instan 
taneously, inferring something normally takes time. (Dennett on 
chess again (op. cit. p. 42): 'the scale of compression when one 
adopts the intentional stance4 towards the two-dimensional 
Do I then take the adoption of what Dennett calls 'the intentional 
stance' to be a matter of pattern-recognition? At least in large part, yes 
I do, though the implications of what I say here for philosophy of mind 
are another story. 
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chess-playing computer galaxy is stupendous: it is the difference 
between figuring out in your head what white's most likely (best) 
move is [and] calculating the state of a few trillion pixels through a 
few hundred thousand generations.') 
Furthermore, a series of inferential moves may be available that 
explain why I have a given perception. For example, going back to 
the sixteen-dot matrix, it is the configuration of the dots that explains 
why I perceive four four-dot squares, or one twelve-dot cross, if I do. 
However?and this is clearly an important contrast?there is more 
phenomenologically speaking to either perception than there is to 
the inference. Inference is, so to speak, topic-neutral. There is 
nothing in particular 'that it is like' to work out why I see a twelve-dot 
cross in the sixteen-dot matrix. By contrast, there is something 'that it 
is like' to see that cross: seeing the cross in the matrix does have a par 
ticular experiential feel. 
Perhaps this point generalises to other cases where we might con 
trast inference and perception. If so then perhaps, for instance, the 
colour scientist can make out her calculations about green without 
having any specific sort of experience, but will perceive green only if 
she has one very particular kind of experience.5 In that case, to say 
that we perceive green will be to say that we grasp instances of this 
motif, and grasp them as instances of the motif. It will also be to 
say that the grasping happens by way of direct apprehension in a par 
ticular sort of experience (namely, seeing green), rather than 
indirectly, by way of inference or step-by-step working it out. A 
colour scientist, if she was sufficiently competent and had enough 
data about the reflectance of nearby surfaces and other relevant 
light conditions, could calculate whether something is or isn't an 
instance of green. Such calculations could give her the knowledge 
that that thing is green. But they would not enable her to see that it 
is green: for they would not give her any awareness of the green 
that comes to her directly, in her experience. 
Perception, in this sense, is a quick, analogue, route to many of 
the same epistemic destinations as can also be reached via the 
digital route of inference. It gets us there with a useful speed, direct 
ness, 'givenness' (cp. the activity/passivity contrast just noted), and 
with a vividness which grounds, and in favourable cases justifies, a 
sense of certainty. Evolutionarily speaking, it is not difficult to see 
the developmental advantages of perceptual capacities like these. 
5 
Cp. Frank Jackson, 'What Mary Didn't Know', Journal of Philosophy 
83.5: 291-295. 
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What is notable for our purposes is the ontological conservatism of 
such capacities. As I have argued, we can suppose that such capacities 
do no more than pick up patterns in some instantiation-base. What 
that instantiation-base might be is in no way constrained by the 
notion of perception as a pattern-detecting capacity. It can be any 
thing, provided it is at least generous enough to sustain the instantia 
tion of whatever sort of patterns we are concerned with. But as we 
have seen, that level of ontological generosity is surprisingly easy to 
come by. 
For all we can tell, then, the instantiation-base of some remarka 
bly complex and recherch? types of patterns or properties might 
be remarkably metaphysically minimal. It might be like this, for ins 
tance, with the patterns that form moral properties. 
5. Perceiving Moral Properties 
David McNaughton writes: 
We might suppose that the only properties that can be observed 
are the 'proper objects' of the five senses: touch, shape, and 
texture; hearing, sound, and so on. If we adopt this austere 
account of what can be perceived it is clear that not only moral 
properties but a great many of the things we normally take our 
selves to perceive will be, strictly speaking, unobservable. If, 
on the other hand, we are prepared to allow that I can see that 
this cliff is dangerous, that Smith is worried, or that one thing 
is further away than another, then there seems no reason to be 
squeamish about letting in moral observation.6 
The upshot of my argument so far is that we should be prepared 
to allow this. There is no profit in restricting perception to sensation 
in the way that McNaughton describes. As he notes, this restriction 
on perception excludes not only moral perception, but many other 
sorts of perception in the wide sense of pattern-recognition or 
Gestalt-uptake (representational perception, as we may call it). Nor, 
I have argued, is that restriction well-motivated by a concern for onto 
logical modesty. If at least some properties are patterns, and at least 
some perception is pattern-recognition, then there can be perception 
of properties which has a very modest ontological base indeed: maybe 
even as modest as my sixteen-dot matrix. Since such perception is 
so modestly based, it does not face the worry about ontological 
6 David McNaughton, Moral Vision (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 57. 
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extravagance. If moral perception is one example of this sort of per 
ception, then there is no good reason why moral perception should 
face the ontological-extravagance worry any more than any other 
example of the kind. 
But this picture of moral epistemology and metaphysics is not just 
a bare possibility for the realist. It is an attractive possibility, because 
it gives him good answers to some of the most familiar problems that 
he faces. Here, in Mackie's words, are two of the best-known: 
If there were objective values, then they would be entities or 
qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different 
from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if we 
were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty 
of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our 
ordinary ways of knowing everything else.7 
Mackie sets the realist a puzzle about moral metaphysics: what could 
moral properties possibly be? And he sets the realist a puzzle about 
moral epistemology: how we could possibly know about moral prop 
erties? On the picture of properties and perception that I have just 
sketched, neither of these puzzles is very puzzling at all. Moral prop 
erties can be just what many other properties are: patterns in reality. 
And our knowledge of moral properties can be representational per 
ception, in just the sense that, in McNaughton's example, seeing that 
a cliff is dangerous can be representational perception. 
If we ask where moral properties are supposed to fit into a scientific 
world-picture, the answer is that there is nothing in a scientific world 
picture to exclude the possibility that the world's constituents should 
be reasonably perceived as standing in patterns that are not them 
selves used in scientific explanations. Likewise, if we ask how moral 
properties relate to the properties that science does use in its expla 
nations, the answer is simply that moral properties and scientific 
properties are two different types of pattern that are both found in 
the same world. Of course, there will be no perceiving these patterns 
without an evolutionary and cultural history that is suitable for the 
emergence of the requisite perceptual capacities. But given obvious 
and familiar facts about our own culture, which is easier to say: that 
we cannot conceive how these perceptual capacities might possibly 
have developed? Or that just such perceptual capacities apparently 
have developed?so obviously can have developed? 
Mackie 1977: J.L. Mackie, Ethics: inventing right and wrong (London: 
Penguin), 38. 
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6. The Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism 
Another notorious difficulty for moral realism is raised by Simon 
Blackburn: 
[I]f A has some naturalistic properties, and is also good, but its 
goodness is a distinct further fact not following [logically] from 
its naturalistic features, and if B has those features as well, then 
it follows that B also is good. And this is a puzzle for the 
realist, because there is no reason at all, on his theory, why this 
should follow. If the goodness is, as it were, an ex gratia 
payment to A, one to which A is not as a matter of logic entitled 
in virtue of being as it is in all naturalistic respects, then it should 
be consistent to suppose that although goodness was given to A, 
it was not given to B, which merely shares the naturalistic features 
that do not entail the goodness.8 
Like most moral theorists, the moral realist wants to say that, if A 
and B share the set N of naturalistic properties, then they must also 
share the set M ofmoral properties. But the realist faces the question: 
why must? The realist cannot say that a minimally rational observer's 
knowledge of the presence of the naturalistic properties N rationally 
commits her to knowledge of the presence of the moral properties M. 
As Blackburn rightly insists, a failure to see that N brings M with it is 
not a failure in logical competence. So why couldn't it be that A and B 
both had N, but only A had M? Blackburn thinks that the realist can 
only leave this mysterious, whereas Blackburn's own projectivist/ 
expressivist theory solves the mystery very neatly. According to the 
expressivist, the reason why, if A and B share N, then they must 
share M, is that we are rationally required to be consistent in our atti 
tudes. Hence the contents of the set M are not properties at all, at least 
not in the same way that the contents of N are properties. They are 
projections of our evaluations onto the world?projections which 
are made 'universalisably' because they are made in compliance 
with the rational requirement of consistency. 
How might a moral realist meet Blackburn's challenge to explain 
the puzzling must without recourse to projectivism? The claim that, 
Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993) p. 119. Nick Zangwill, 'Moral Supervenience', 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Volume 20: Moral Concepts, ed. French, P., 
Uehling, T., and Wettstein, H., University of Notre Dame Press (1996), 
argues that this is the best formulation of Blackburn's argument. Without 
going into the technicalities of Blackburn exegesis, I agree. 
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if A and B share the set N of naturalistic properties, then they must 
also share the set M of moral properties, comes out on the present 
line of thought as a claim about the necessary relations of patterns. 
The claim will take the form: 'If A and B both exemplify one 
pattern NP, then they must both exemplify another pattern MP'. 
And we can explain this sort of 'must' without any difficulty at all. 
We cash it out by an explanation parallel to the one in which we 
explain how, if anything is a sixteen-dot matrix like the one displayed 
above, then it must be possible to see a cross pattern in it, and a four 
square pattern, and a three-corridor pattern (vertical or horizontal) 
etc.; or how, if anything is a duck-rabbit, then it must be possible 
to see a duck in it; and also a rabbit; etc. 
'But this response makes the relation of naturalistic and moral 
properties a matter of entailment.' Yes and no. Yes, because the 
relationship is indeed entailment, or something very like it, at the 
level of the analysis of the patterns. The duck-rabbit pattern contains 
the duck pattern and the rabbit pattern; the sixteen-dot matrix con 
tains the cross and four-square patterns; and so on?and containment 
is of course a familiar and fruitful way of understanding at least most9 
cases of entailment. No, because the relationship is nothing like 
entailment at the level of pattern-recognition. It is perfectly possible 
to perceive the duck-rabbit without perceiving the duck, or the 
rabbit, or both, and to perceive the sixteen-dot matrix without per 
ceiving the cross, or the four-square pattern, or both. Moreover, 
you cannot argue anyone into seeing any pattern. All you can do is 
give them nudges and hints, 'assemble reminders',10 prompt them 
with encouraging prods like 'Do you get the drift?'11 or 'Can you 
see what it is yet?' (as Rolf Harris would say)?and hope that they 
will catch on, and start to experience the relevant sort of Gestalt in 
their perceptions.12 
'At most': containment is a good intuitive picture for and-elimination, 
but hardly for or-introduction. 
See L.Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1951), I, 127. 11 See John McDowell, 'Virtue and Reason', The Monist 62 (1979): 
331-50. 
12 
'Catching on' to patterns is an uncodifiable business, and a num 
ber of philosophers, following John McDowell ('Non-Cognitivism and 
Rule-Following', in Steven Holtzman and Christopher Leich, eds., 
Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 
1981), pp. 141-62), have been impressed by the idea that there might be 
an essential connection between uncodifiability and genuine (non 
naturalistic) objectivity: that idea leads us naturally into moral particularism 
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The point is the same as before: moral inference and moral percep 
tion go their different ways to the same destination, moral knowledge. 
The present application of the point is this: working out a complete 
moral theory would mean so thoroughly explaining the relation 
that holds between naturalistic and moral properties that that relation 
would, in the theory, become one of (very complicated and long 
winded) entailment. This would disprove Gilbert Harman's claim 
that, 'conceived as an explanatory theory, morality, unlike science, 
seems to be cut off from observation'.13 For it would give us a 
moral theory that explained both why there is moral perception, 
and also how moral perception can be correct. 
However, moral theory is one thing, and moral perception is 
another. Since moral perception's ambition is not to turn into 
moral theory, but to get more accurate as perception, there is no 
reason to say that someone who does not grasp these inferential 
relations is cognitively defective. Lack of information, like not 
knowing what time the bus comes, may be a cognitive limitation, 
but we do not call it a cognitive defect, like not being able to under 
stand a bus timetable even in favourable conditions. Since, on the 
other hand, the relation between the naturalistic and the moral is 
something that can in principle be explained by the sort of realistic 
moral theory that I am developing here, there is no (in-principle) 
mystery about why the perceptions of certain naturalistic and moral 
patterns go together. Thus the realist can?in principle?explain 
what Blackburn says he cannot about the supervenience of the 
moral on the naturalistic. 
7. Moral Realism and Motivation 
J.L. Mackie's famous puzzle about the 'queerness' of moral proper 
ties can be understood differently from the two ways, metaphysical 
and epistemological, that I took it in section 5. Understood this 
third way, Mackie is posing a further puzzle, often set for the 
realist by other authors too, about how any property could be intrin 
sically motivating. His complaint is that an objectively existing moral 
of one sort or another (see e.g. Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1992)). The idea is interesting, though I cannot see the connec 
tion myself. 
Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), 9. 
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property would have to be something that combined existence with 
'intrinsic to-be-pursuedness'; while a perception of such a moral 
property would have to combine representation with motivation. 
Mackie does not see how anything could combine these two features. 
Plato's Forms give a dramatic picture of what objective values 
would have to be... [As with a Form], an objective good would 
be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because 
of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so con 
stituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has 
to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it. (Mackie op. cit. p. 40) 
The moral realist might begin his response to this with an evolution 
ary point. In evolutionary terms, what is hard to explain is not the 
representation that motivates, but the representation that does not 
motivate. As a matter of the history of our species, the (original) 
point of perceptual capacities in a tough world must usually have 
been to mandate response rather than to get hold of information for 
its own sake. Think this way of echolocation: the bat gets hold of a 
pattern which is the shape of a wall in front of it, and that pattern 
mandates a response which is an alteration of flight-path. The 
general schema for such motivating representations will be: Pattern P 
in context C mandates response R from X. It is not obvious why 
this schema cannot apply to moral perception in humans just as 
much as to echolocation in bats. 
Further, we can observe some distinctions. First of all, there is a 
difference between the notion of an intrinsically motivating property 
(or perception?I won't keep adding this), and the notion of an 
intrinsically reason-giving property. Mackie's phrase 'intrinsic 
to-be-pursuedness' seems ambiguous between these notions. Is 
Mackie puzzled about the idea of a property that is intrinsically 
such as to cause motivation in its perceivers? Or is he puzzled about 
the idea of a property that is intrinsically such as to give reasons to 
its perceivers? Or, a different possibility, is he puzzled about the 
idea of a property that intrinsically motivates because it intrinsically 
gives reasons to its perceivers? And a further question: how should 
we take 'intrinsically' here? Is an 'intrinsically to-be-pursued' prop 
erty one that, of itself, must cause motivations or give reasons (strong 
intrinsicness, if you like)? Or is it one that, in and of itself, can cause 
motivations or give reasons (weak intrinsicness)?14 
4 There is a third and a fourth sort of ambiguity in the formulations 
too, which for simplicity I leave out of the main discussion. 'Intrinsically 
motivating property' could mean a property that of itself (a) always or 
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All of these are different possibilities, and it is not clear to me that 
any of them is bizarre or queer. Agonising pain may well be strongly 
intrinsically motivating: that is, if you feel it, then you will necessarily 
be motivated to try and get away from it. Mild pain, or pleasure of any 
strength, may be weakly intrinsically motivating: if you feel it, then 
you can be motivated to avoid it (mild pain) or seek it out (pleasure). 
Many properties that aren't in any obvious way moral properties are 
widely thought to be intrinsically reason-giving, either strongly or 
weakly. If you encounter a case of cogent argument, for example, 
then its cogency necessarily gives you a reason to believe its conclusion 
(as some would say, going for strong intrinsic reason-giving); or at 
any rate can give you a reason to believe that conclusion (as others 
would say, preferring weak intrinsic reason-giving). If there is 
queerness in any of this, it is hard to see where. Or does the queerness 
reside in the possibility that some properties might (sometimes) 
intrinsically motivate because they intrinsically give reasons to their 
perceivers? But to find that queer, it seems to me, is to boggle at a 
truism about rationality: that rational agents do at least some of the 
things that they do because they believe they have reason to do those 
things. This, of course, is a case of motivation by a belief, not a 
desire, and that is anathema to orthodox Humeanism. But this sort 
of motivation seems so well-established and so familiar a phenom 
enon that I have little to say about that except 'So much the worse 
for orthodox Humeanism'. 
My discussion of the argument from queerness read in this last 
way, as posing a problem about intrinsic to-be-pursuedness, pro 
duces some interesting provisional conclusions about externalism 
and internalism about motivation. In particular, it shows how 
someone could be an internalist about reason-givingness, but an 
externalist about motivating force. That is to say, he could hold 
that there are moral properties that are intrinsically reason-giving 
(in that those moral properties of themselves must or can, always or 
sometimes, give reasons), without holding that there are moral 
(b) sometimes (1) successfully motivates (or gives an overriding reason), or 
one that of itself (a) always or (b) sometimes (2) motivates at least to some 
extent (or gives at least some reason). Since (al) is an implausibly strong 
combination of claims?how many powers are there anywhere that are 
always efficacious??it is presumably the other three sorts of claims 
(a2, bl, b2) that are usually meant. Much scope for ambiguity and unclarity 
remains, however. Without suitable magnifying equipment, it is hard, for 
instance, to refute (a2) the claim that a property always has some effect, 
however tiny. 
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properties that are intrinsically motivating (in that those moral prop 
erties of themselves must or can, always or sometimes, move agents to 
action). This is my own position. 
In sections 4, 5, and 6 I have showed how a moral realism derived 
from a parsimonious ontology could have the resources to deal with 
three standard objections to realism. In section 7 I have dealt with 
a fourth standard objection to realism, though the discussion has, 
necessarily, ranged rather more widely, and has not been related 
only to the specific form of moral realism that I have been advocating. 
The last section, section 8, brings that specific form of realism back 
into focus. Having argued that these four problems are not the real 
problem about moral realism, I shall briefly point out what is. 
8. Realism and Relativism 
It is evident from my discussion of matrices like the sixteen-dot one 
of section 1 that I admit the reality of all sorts of patterns. This, 
together with the claim that properties including moral properties 
are patterns, gets me the result that moral properties are no less real 
than all the other patterns that we might perceive in reality. 
Unfortunately it also gets me the result that indefinitely many 
other sorts of other patterns are there in reality too. Moral relativism 
will be back with a vengeance if I can't show that there is something 
special about the patterns, among all these other patterns, that are par 
ticularly formed by moral properties. And relativism might seem to 
be getting back in anyway, since we can hardly avoid admitting the 
claim that moral-perceptual capacities develop with culture: isn't it 
obvious that different cultures develop (at least some) different 
capacities, that different moral observers (at least sometimes) perceive 
different moral properties, or different relations of salience between 
the moral properties? 
No doubt, one of the best ways of answering this difficulty will be to 
attack relativism head-on, as incoherent or self-refuting or whatever; 
but that is another story that I cannot tell here. And no doubt one of 
the other best responses begins by suggesting that the point of devel 
oping capacities for detecting and responding to the patterns that we 
call the moral properties is given by human interests: both those 
interests that humans have as the particular kind of creatures they 
are, and also those interests that humans would have to have no 
matter what kind of creatures (or rational creatures) they were. The 
patterns that are salient as the moral properties must, therefore, be 
the patterns that it is most useful and helpful for us to heed in 
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pursuit of these interests. Moral relativism will only be a serious 
threat if there is no fact of the matter about which patterns these 
are. However, we cannot pretend that we have already worked out 
in full which properties are the salient ones for anything like an 
optimal normative ethics. It can be perfectly reasonable to see this 
as a question still in play for further cross-cultural negotiation. But 
to say this, of course, is to admit that a full answer to relativism of 
this sort is also another story, and furthermore, that the story is not 
yet over. 
Thus moral relativism remains, at this stage in the dialectic, an 
unrefuted alternative to moral realism. Hence the moral that I close 
with: ontological extravagance is not the problem for the moral 
realist, relativism is.15 
The Open University 
Thanks for comments to Alex Barber, Chris Belshaw, Sarah Broadie, 
Dan Hutto, Simon Kirchin, John Lippitt, Derek Matravers, Tim Mulgan, 
and Carolyn Price. 
437 
